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A DEAL IS A DEAL:
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS REGARDING
THE RELIGIOUS UPBRINGING OF CHILDREN
SHOULD BE ENFORCEABLE
JOCELYN E. STRAUBER
INTRODUCTION
Paul and Julie, Christian and Jewish, meet and eventually decide
to marry.1 They plan to have children. Before they marry, they discuss their religious differences and decide to determine what type of
religious upbringing they will give their children. Neither is devoutly
religious, but Julie wants to raise her children as Jews and does not
want them to attend church. Paul agrees to raise the children as
Jews, but doesn’t want them to miss out on some of the Christian traditions he enjoyed as a child. He’d like his children to celebrate
Christmas and Easter at home. Julie agrees. She recognizes that
agreements regarding religious upbringing are often difficult to enforce and suggests that they put theirs in writing. The agreement is

1. The following hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of several recent cases in
which a couple decides, before they marry, what religious upbringing their prospective children
will have. Paul and Julie’s hypothetical agreement, however, is much more specific than any
agreement made by the couples in those cases. See, e.g., Weiss v. Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339,
341 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (reciting that mother made a pledge witnessed by three rabbis that all
children would be raised Jewish); Sotnick v. Sotnick, 650 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (noting that during their marriage the parents made a written declaration to the Jewish
community to raise their son Jewish); Kirchner v. Caughey, 606 A.2d 257, 260 (Md. 1992)
(observing that the parents “orally agreed,” when their daughter was born, to raise her as a
Catholic); Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (Mass. 1997) (reciting that the parents
agreed that their children would be raised in the Jewish faith); Hornung v. Hornung, 485
N.W.2d 335, 336 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the parents were married in the Catholic
church and agreed to raise their children as Catholics in the church); MacLagan v. Klein, 473
S.E.2d 778, 781 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (observing that the unmarried parents had agreed to raise
their daughter in the Jewish faith); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1141 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990) (noting that the parents discussed their religious differences and agreed to raise their
children in the Jewish faith).

971

STRAUBER

972

07/17/98 3:43 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:971

very important to her and although neither acknowledge it, they
might not be married without it.
Paul and Julie draft an agreement detailing every aspect of their
prospective children’s religious education that will occur outside the
home. They agree that in their home they will be free to discuss religion with their children, to decorate their house for religious holidays, and to celebrate the rituals and observe the traditions important to each of them. But they also agree that their children will
receive a Jewish upbringing with respect to the religious activities
that occur outside the home. The agreement covers the children’s
naming ceremonies, synagogue membership, religious education, religious activities (such as playgroups, picnics, dances and afterschool
workshops run by their synagogue), and religious rites of passage
such as bar and bat mitzvahs. They agree that they will not bring
their children to church services, religious school, or other religious
activities and that their children will not be, baptized or participate in
other Christian rites of passage such as confirmation. Their agreement also includes definitions of the terms used. For example
“church services” is defined to exclude family events such as weddings, funerals, and baptisms for their friends and family. The term
“religious activities” is defined to include all church-sponsored activities, such as camps, afterschool programs and retreats, whether or not
2
those activities have an express religious purpose. The agreement
also includes a statement that both parties intend for it to apply in the
event of divorce and that they both knowingly and willingly assent to
its terms. When their children are born, they raise them as Jews as
they agreed.
After ten years of marriage and two children, Paul and Julie divorce. They are granted joint legal custody. The children live with
Julie during the week, and with Paul on all weekends and school vacations. Several months after the divorce, the children tell Julie that
Paul has been taking them to church services on Sunday mornings for
several weeks. Julie reminds Paul of their agreement and asks him to
stop taking the children to church. Paul refuses to abide by the
2. This agreement does not seek to entirely preclude either party from sharing religious
beliefs with his or her children—a process that is arguably as central to a religious upbringing
as attendance at religious services. It seeks only to identify those areas of religious upbringing
that could be the subject of an enforceable contract. In that sense, the agreement is a compromise. All children of an interfaith marriage will likely be influenced by the religious beliefs of
both of their parents. But an agreement such as this one would allow a parent to ensure that
her children receive formal religious training in one religion only.
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agreement, explaining that his religion has become more important
to him since his marriage. He wishes to share his beliefs and traditions with his children, at formal services as well as in his own home.
Julie seeks a court order to enforce the agreement.
*

*

*

Interfaith marriage is relatively common in the United States today.3 The percentage of Jews who marry Gentiles has been rising
steadily since the early 1900s and is now at just over fifty percent.4
The comparable intermarriage figure for Catholics is twenty-one percent, for Mormons, thirty percent and for Muslims, forty percent.5
One of the most difficult questions an interfaith couple faces is that
of the religious upbringing of their children.6 Many couples discuss
this issue before they marry and make some kind of agreement about
their children’s religious upbringing.7 Some agreements are explicit,
while others may be deemed implied—perhaps by one spouse’s decision to convert to the other spouse’s faith.8 Such agreements, if ex-

3. The hypothetical and the majority of cases cited in this Note involve Jews who marry
Christians, but the argument applies to all interfaith marriages, regardless of the faith of either
parent.
4. See ELLEN JAFFE MCCLAIN, EMBRACING THE STRANGER: INTERMARRIAGE AND THE
FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY 10 (1995).
5. See Jerry Adler, A Matter of Faith, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 1997, at 48, 50.
6. See EGON MAYER, LOVE AND TRADITION: MARRIAGE BETWEEN JEWS AND
CHRISTIANS 10 (1985) (stating that the subject of interfaith marriage “arouses strong feelings
and challenges deeply held convictions”); REGER C. SMITH, TWO CULTURES, ONE MARRIAGE: PREMARITAL COUNSELING FOR MIXED MARRIAGES 40 (1996) (noting that decisions
about the religious upbringing of children are a “major problem” for interfaith couples); Leo
Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U. L. REV. 333, 333 (1955) (claiming that
there are few other areas of litigation that can evoke stronger and more impassioned reactions
than parents who are in court over the religious upbringing of their children). Among JewishGentile couples, 27.8% reported that they were raising their children as Jews, 30.8% said that
they were raising their children without religion and 41.4% that they were raising children in a
religion other than Judaism. See MCCLAIN, supra note 4, at 10.
7. Several counselors have suggested that handling this issue prior to marriage is most
likely to reduce potential parental conflicts that may arise later. See ROY A. ROSENBERG ET
AL., HAPPILY INTERMARRIED 135-36 (1988) (discussing the various alternatives that ChristianJewish interfaith couples may choose once their children are born, but noting that “ideally, father and mother should have decided this before their wedding”).
8. See, e.g., Abbo v. Briskin, 660 So. 2d 1157, 1158-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that the wife converted to Judaism as a condition of marriage, thereby suggesting that she
agreed to raise any children of the marriage as Jews).
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plicit, generally consist of vague promises, either oral or written,
about the faith in which the couple’s children will be raised.9
While these agreements may pose few problems during the marriage, frequently, upon divorce, one parent breaches the agreement.10
She brings the children to a church or synagogue although she had
agreed not to and had not done so prior to divorce. He discusses religion in a manner that she considers “indoctrination.” Thus far,
those parents who have sought to enjoin such behavior on the basis of
an antenuptial religious upbringing agreement have failed.11 Courts
generally have refused to restrict either a parent’s religious activity
with his or her children or a parent’s religious discussions with his or
her children on the basis of such an agreement.12 Courts either ignore
the agreement entirely or conclude that the agreement is unenforceable.13 Courts will restrict a parent from engaging in religious activities that threaten to “harm” the children, but are otherwise reluctant
to curtail either parent’s ability to influence his or her children’s religious upbringing.14 In fact, a court will structure custody or visitation to enable each parent to do so.15
Courts refuse to enforce antenuptial religious upbringing agreements under standard contract principles when the agreements are so
vague that the courts cannot determine to what the parties agreed.16
Most agreements don’t explicitly provide for enforcement upon divorce; some courts describe divorce as an unforeseen event that in9. See, e.g., Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the mother
executed a declaration of faith, witnessed by three rabbis, pledging to rear all her children in
loyalty to the Jewish faith and its practices); Sotnick v. Sotnick, 650 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (stating that parents, during their marriage, made a written declaration to
“enter their minor son into God’s covenant with Israel”); In re Marriage of Neuchterlein, 587
N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (indicating that prior to marriage the parties had orally
agreed to raise any future children in the Lutheran faith); Kirchner v. Caughey, 606 A.2d 257,
260 (Md. 1992) (recounting the mother’s claim that the parties had orally agreed to raise their
child in the Catholic faith); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1141, 1145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(noting that prior to marriage the parties orally agreed that their children would be raised as
Jews).
10. See cases cited supra note 1. This Note does not address the role such an agreement
might play in regulating the ongoing marriage.
11. See cases cited supra note 1.
12. See Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 n.5 (Mass. 1997) (noting that “[t]he
majority of courts adhere to the view that predivorce agreements are unconstitutionally [sic]
unenforceable”); see also infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
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validates the agreement.17 Courts also hold that enforcement of these
contracts would violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
of the Constitution.18 They find that enforcement requires the court
to determine the content of a religious upbringing and to oversee and
supervise religious matters; and may impermissibly involve the court
in the oversight and supervision of religious matters.19 Courts find
that enforcement violates the Free Exercise Clause because it interferes with a parent’s right to contribute to his or her children’s religious upbringing.20
This Note argues that courts should enforce antenuptial religious
upbringing agreements that resemble the agreement made by Paul
and Julie. Courts correctly refuse to enforce vague agreements that
consist of promises to raise one’s children in a particular faith, or to
issue broad orders that prohibit a parent from exercising any religious influence over his or her children. However, a written, specific
agreement, limited to religious rituals and activities which occur outside the home can be enforced, based on neutral principles of contract law, without violating constitutional principles of religious freedom.
Part I of this Note discusses the courts’ approach, across jurisdictions, to child custody and visitation disputes where the parents practice different religions and religion is a factor in their disputes. It
compares the courts’ approach to conflicts regarding a child’s religious upbringing in situations where parents do not have an antenuptial religious upbringing agreement and in situations in which they do
have such an agreement. Part II discusses the judicial rationale for
nonenforcement of these agreements based on contract principles. It
critiques that rationale and offers alternatives to it, in support of enforcement. Part III discusses the judicial rationale for nonenforcement of these agreements based on constitutional principles, critiques
that rationale and offers alternatives to it, in support of enforcement.
An Appendix to the Note presents a model antenuptial religious upbringing agreement that a court could enforce under the reasoning
suggested.

17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.1-2.
See infra Part III.A.3.
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I. THE COURTS’ APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS ISSUES IN CUSTODY OR
VISITATION DISPUTES
A. Situations Where Parents Have No Antenuptial Agreement
Regarding Religious Upbringing
To understand the courts’ treatment of antenuptial religious upbringing agreements, it is necessary to first examine the broad range
of religious issues in child custody disputes generally. Courts often
rely on general principles that govern custody disputes involving religious issues to resolve a dispute in which the parents have a religious upbringing agreement, rather than addressing the enforceability
of the agreement itself. Also, as few courts have addressed the enforceability of religious upbringing agreements, those courts who discuss their enforceability do so within the framework of those general
principles.
The religious upbringing a parent provides may or may not be
explicitly identified as a factor for the court to consider in making a
custody award. Children custody statutes vary slightly by state and
custody cases vary widely by state, by court and by case.21 In most
states, state statutes direct the courts to determine the best interests
of the child and make the custody award on that basis. The courts
have broad discretion to make that determination, as most state statutes simply identify a number of general factors that courts might
find relevant to the child’s best interests.22 Some statutes include the
21. In addition to providing different guidelines for custody determinations, states also
offer different custody arrangements. For example, some states provide for both joint legal
custody arrangements, in which both parents have the right to make all decisions affecting their
children’s welfare, and sole custody arrangements, in which those determinations are made exclusively by one parent. See, e.g., AL. STAT. §§ 30-3-150 to 30-3-152 (Michie Supp. 1997)
(expressing the state policy of assuring frequent and continuing contact with both parents, and
defining joint physical or legal custody); ARIZ REV. STAT. § 25-402 (West Supp. 1997)
(defining joint legal and physical custody, as well as sole custody); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 30023004, 3006-3007 (West 1994); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (Law. Co-op. 1994) (defining
sole legal custody, shared legal custody, shared physical custody).
22. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West Supp. 1998) (directing court to consider any
relevant factors, always to include those specified in statute, primarily directed toward health,
safety, and welfare of child); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(a)(2) (Supp. 1997) (a court resolving a
custody dispute may “take into consideration all circumstances of the case”); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.270(1)(a)-(f) (Banks-Baldwin 1990) (directing court to determine best interests of
child, considering “all relevant factors,” including the wishes of parent, wishes of the child, interaction of child with parents and siblings, adjustment to home, school and community, mental
health of all individuals, and information and records of domestic violence); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 208, § 31 (Law. Co-op. 1994) (directing court to consider the “happiness and welfare of the
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child’s “adjustment to religion” as one of the factors.23 The courts focus on the interests of the children, not the rights of the parents.24
At the same time, however, a court cannot make a custody
award that expresses a preference for one parent’s religion over the
other’s. To discriminate between persons on the basis of religion is
clearly unconstitutional,25 and a custody determination improperly
based on religious bias violates a parent’s constitutional rights.26 As a
general rule, courts refuse to weigh the merits of a parent’s religion in
making custody determinations, even when that religion will clearly
affect the children’s lifestyle.27
child,” and describing factors that should be weighed); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-364 (Michie
1995 & Supp. 1997) (setting forth an extensive list of factors including: general considerations
of moral fitness; the parent’s sexual conduct; the emotional relationship between the children
and the parents; and the attitude and stability of the parent’s character). Some states simply
ask the court to consider the children’s best interests, without further clarification. See, e.g.,
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998) (stating that the court “shall enter
orders for custody and support as, in the court’s discretion, justice requires, having regard to
the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the
child”).
23. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(5)(b) (West 1993) (directing court to consider “[t]he
child’s adjustment to the home, school, religion and community”).
24. See R. Collin Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May Be Unconstitutional:
Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25, 44 (1981).
25. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (stating that “this Court
has come to understand [that] . . . government may not . . . discriminate among persons on the
basis of their religious beliefs and practices”); see also Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1702, 1720 (1984) (arguing that basing custody decisions on religion violates the Establishment Clause “by putting the authority, influence, official support and coercive power of the
state behind religion”).
26. See Zucco v. Garrett, 501 N.E.2d 875, 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating that a court’s
preference for a parent’s participation in organized religion in awarding child custody would
directly and immediately advance religion); Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ohio 1992)
(citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that courts cannot implement private
racial prejudices, even those widely held by the population)); see also Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592
P.2d 1233, 1243 (Alaska 1979) (explaining that preferring parents who are members of an organized religious community over those who are not will encourage nonreligious parents to
engage in religious practices even if their beliefs are insincere).
27. See, e.g., Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 517-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (rejecting
argument that mother’s affiliation with sect that prohibited social contact with non-members,
participation in civic or political activities, ownership of radios or televisions and giving toys to
children was necessarily contrary to her child’s best interests); Garrett v. Garrett, 527 N.W.2d
213, 221 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to reverse custody award to mother on the basis of her
religious practices as a Jehovah’s Witness, and rejecting father’s argument that the harm caused
by those practices, such as confusion and separation from other children, amounted to the requisite “immediate and substantial threat” to a child’s health and welfare); Pater v. Pater, 588
N.E.2d 794, 799-80 (Ohio 1992) (reversing a custody award to father that was based on evidence that mother, a Jehovah’s Witness, would forbid children to celebrate holidays, be in-
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It is generally only when a court finds that one parent’s religion
poses an actual threat to a child’s mental or physical health, or a substantial likelihood of harm to that child’s health or welfare, that a
parent’s religion becomes relevant to a custody determination.28 In
that situation, a court will consider a parent’s religiously motivated
behavior in making a custody determination.29 Such findings are rare,
however, as most courts require concrete evidence of actual impairment of a child’s well being.30 This high standard of harm represents
the judicial attempt to balance the state’s concern for a child’s welfare against each parent’s right to freely practice his or her religion,
free from a court’s evaluation of its merits.
Courts apply the same standard of harm when a parent seeks to
modify a prior custody or visitation decree by an order restricting the
other parent’s freedom to expose his or her children to a particular
religion, or by an order requiring that parent to raise his or her children in a particular religion. In general, each parent is free to discuss
religion with his or her children, take them to religious services or
engage in other religious activities with them when he or she has custody31 or during periods of visitation. The noncustodial parent has
volved in extracurricular activities or salute the flag as an unconstitutional evaluation of the
merits of a parent’s religion); Gould v. Gould, 342 N.W.2d 426, 432-33 (Wis. 1984) (holding
that trial court abused its discretion in transferring custody from mother to father based on belief that religious affiliation furnished by father would be better than absence of religious affiliation in mother’s home); see also Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383
(1989) (exploring the constitutional questions raised by the use of religion as a factor in child
custody cases).
28. See Bienenfeld v. Bennett-White, 605 A.2d 172, 182-85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)
(holding that since the mother attempted to restrict the children’s access to the father because
of her religious views and the resulting conflict between the parents adversely affected the son’s
mental well being, consideration of religion was appropriate); Burnham v. Burnham, 304
N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Neb. 1981) (holding that the mother’s religious beliefs would have a
“deleterious effect . . . on the relationship between the father and his daughter [and] upon the
well-being of the child herself”).
29. For instance, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944), the Court upheld
the application of state child labor laws to prohibit street preaching by children, even when
children are accompanied by a guardian. The Court noted that children could suffer physical
and psychological injuries if permitted to preach along highways. See id. at 170. Presumably, a
parent’s behavior in encouraging a child to participate in such conduct could be considered in a
custody determination proceeding, despite the parent’s underlying religious motivation.
30. See Beschle, supra note 27, at 401.
31. Custody arrangements will vary in each case. Beginning in the late 1970s, a large
number of states began enacting joint custody laws. See Beschle, supra note 27, at 389 n.36. In
a joint legal custody arrangement, both parents are involved in the major decisions regarding a
child’s welfare. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 208, § 31 (Law. Co-op. 1994) (defining “shared
legal custody” as “continued mutual responsibility and involvement by both parents in major
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this right even when the other parent has sole custody.32 Sole legal
custody frequently confers authority over a child’s religious upbringing.33 The majority of courts hold that a custodial parent who seeks a
court order restricting the noncustodial parent’s activities will be required to make a clear and affirmative showing that exposure to conflicting religions will cause substantial harm to the children.34 In the
absence of a clear threat to the child’s welfare, courts are reluctant to
interfere with either parent’s right to practice religion with his or her
children, in whatever way he or she chooses to do so.35

decisions regarding the child’s welfare including matters of education, medical care, and emotional, moral and religious development” and defining “sole legal custody” as granting one
parent “the right and responsibility to make major decisions regarding the child’s welfare including matters of education, medical care and emotional, moral and religious development”).
If one parent has sole custody, the child will reside with that parent and that parent will make
all decisions regarding the child’s welfare, subject to reasonable visitation by the other parent.
See id.
32. See, e.g., Murga v. Petersen, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that in
the majority of American jurisdictions, courts have refused to restrain the noncustodial parent
from exposing the children to his or her religious practices without a clear showing of harm).
33. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-130 (1997) (“The custodian may determine the
child’s upbringing, including his education, health care, and religious training . . . .”), MASS.
ANN. LAWS. ch. 208, § 31 (Law. Co-op. 1994) (defining the responsibilities associated with sole
custody, including authority to make major decisions regarding a child’s religious development).
34. See Kevin S. Smith, Note, Religious Visitation Constraints on the Noncustodial Parent:
The Need for National Application of a Uniform Compelling Interest Test, 71 IND. L.J. 815, 820
(1996) (discussing the substantial harm standard, and arguing that despite its consistent application, the standard’s vague language fails to ensure a consistent level of protection for the noncustodial parent’s rights).
35. See, e.g., Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (noting that “the majority of American jurisdictions . . . have refused to restrain the noncustodial parent from exposing the minor child to his
or her religious beliefs and practices, absent a clear, affirmative showing that these religious
activities will be harmful to the child”); Kirchner v. Caughey, 606 A.2d 257, 260-64 (Md. 1992)
(holding that a restriction barring noncustodial father’s ability to have the child participate in
any church related activity was too broad, but suggesting that activities that involve
“proselytizing” should be prohibited to the extent that the noncustodial parent’s religious practices were causing the child to experience harmful emotional distress); Fisher v. Fisher, 324
N.W.2d 582, 585 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (refusing to order the custodial mother to continue the
children’s Christian education and training at the request of the father, without a showing that
the mother’s religious “practices threaten the children’s well being”); Hanson v. Hanson, 404
N.W.2d 460, 464 (N.D. 1987) (holding that the affliction of psychological stress on children resulting from the noncustodial father’s attempts to impose his religious beliefs upon them fell
short of a clear affirmative showing of physical or emotional harm); Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d
1133, 1135 (Wash. 1971) (finding that constitutional requirement of impartiality between religions prohibits limitations on a parent’s religious practices with his or her children in the absence of a clear and affirmative showing that the children’s welfare is detrimentally affected by
those practices).
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Nevertheless, decisions on this point are inconsistent. The terms
“harm” and “threat to well being” are capable of numerous constructions. Some courts seem willing to label many types of emotional
stress as “harm” and restrict parents on that basis;36 others require a
showing of greater mental or physical harm.37 Most courts apply either an actual or substantial threat of harm standard, however, regardless of whether the parents have a joint custody arrangement or a
sole custody arrangement.38 In a joint custody arrangement, courts
protect each parent’s right to engage in religious activities.39 By the
nature of a sole custody with visitation arrangement, the parent with
visitation rights can engage in religious activities during his or her periods of visitation; the sole custodian can do so at all other times.
In adjudicating custody disputes involving religion, the court
both seeks to protect the parent’s constitutional rights, and to safeguard the welfare of the children.40 While courts have applied the
36. See, e.g., Funk v. Ossmann, 724 P.2d 1247, 1250-51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (prohibiting a
noncustodial father from taking his children to Jewish religious training during visitation periods because of the detrimental effect of the Jewish training upon the child’s welfare); Ledoux v.
Ledoux, 452 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 1990) (holding that the psychological stress experienced by
children due to their parents’ conflict over religion was sufficiently harmful to justify an order
restricting Mr. Ledoux from exposing the children to any practices inconsistent with those
taught by Mrs. Ledoux, the custodial parent); Bentley v. Bentley, 448 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1982) (finding emotional strain emanating from parents’ conflict over religion sufficient to justify order prohibiting a noncustodial parent from instructing children in Jehovah’s
Witness’ teachings and from taking them to religious and social activities); S.E.L. v. J.W.W.,
541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 679 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989) (allowing a father to take his daughter to Jehovah’s
Witness’ services but prohibiting any further exposure to the religion because it threatened to
cause psychological “strain and conflict”); MacLagan v. Klein, 473 S.E.2d 778, 787 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1996) (affirming the modification of custody order by awarding joint custody to nonJewish mother and Jewish father and ordering mother to cooperate in father’s program of religious training, because of finding that child has a positive sense of identity as a Jew and interference with that will impact her emotional well being).
37. See Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (reversing portion of an order which restricted noncustodial father from discussing religious activities with his child despite evidence of child’s anxiety and temper tantrums prior to his visits with his father), see also cases cited supra note 27.
38. See cases cited supra note 36 (barring religious activity when causing either actual or
threatened harm).
39. See, e.g., Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that
when parents have joint physical and legal custody, each is entitled to engage in religious activities with his or her children during periods of lawful custody and visitation in the absence of a
showing that doing so presents a risk of substantial harm to the children).
40. See Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607-08 (Mass. 1981) (noting that although the
dominant goal is to serve the child’s best interest, that does not require courts to curtail one
parent’s liberties by limiting his religious influence). In Zummo, the court held that:
[I]n order to justify restrictions upon parent’s rights to inculcate religious beliefs in
their children, the party seeking the restriction must demonstrate by competent evidence that the belief or practice of the party to be restricted actually presents a sub-
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“harm” or “threat” standard inconsistently, the use of that standard,
as opposed to the more flexible best interest standard, suggests that
courts are reluctant to interfere with a parent’s constitutionally protected right to control the religious upbringing of his or her children.41
While courts will step in when necessary to protect a child from
harm, they seek to leave questions of religious upbringing to the parents where it is possible to do so. In the context of an interfaith divorce, most courts are unwilling to find harm merely because a child
is exposed to two contrary religions.42 As a governing principle,
courts find that “the question of a child’s religion must be left to the
parents even if they clash[, as a] child’s religion is no proper business
of judges.”43 Moreover, the court
cannot regulate by its processes the internal affairs of the home . . . .
The vast majority of matters concerning the upbringing of children
must be left to the conscience, patience, and self restraint of father
and mother. No end of difficulties would arise should judges try to
44
tell parents how to bring up their children.

stantial threat of present or future physical or emotional harm to the particular children.
Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1156.
For a contrary view, see generally Carl E. Schneider, Religion and Children Custody, 25
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879 (1992) (examining the Ledoux decision). Schneider concludes that
the “immediate and substantial threat” test is, in fact, a best interests test, that is particularly
tolerant of judicial intervention and seems to invite courts to optimize a child’s circumstances.
Id. at 898-99.
41. Cf. Schneider, supra note 40, at 900 (noting that “[t]he best-interest standard is always
troublesome because it ignores parental interests” and makes intervention “markedly too
easy”).
42. See Felton, 418 N.E.2d at 607-08 (noting that “[t]here may also be a value in letting the
child[ren] see, even at an early age, the religious models between which it is likely to be led to
choose in later life”); see also Mentry v. Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(citing Felton and endorsing a child’s exposure to the religious views of his or her parents, despite their disparity); Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1348-50 (1994) (arguing that although a child may experience religious
confusion when confronted with two distinct “brand[s]” of religion, allowing multiple influences prevents the domination of one parent’s religious tradition and “leave[s the child] free to
grow into his own, undominated adult self”).
43. Abbo v. Briskin, 660 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Courts also seem to
fear that impinging in any way upon the parent-children relationship might “limit or destroy
the relationship.” See Fatemi v. Fatemi, 489 A.2d 798, 800 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that
restrictions on the parent-child relationship ought not be imposed unless it can be shown that
some detrimental impact will flow from the specific behavior of the parent).
44. Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 848 (citing Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1936));
see also Schwarzman v. Schwarzman, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993, 997-98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (noting
that New York has “long pursued a policy of non-intervention in the internal management of
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If a parent asks a court to alter visitation to make it possible, or
more convenient for that parent to involve his or her child in religious activities, most courts will issue such orders, without a showing
of harm to the child in the absence of such orders.45 The majority of
courts characterize these orders as “accommodations” and find that
they are constitutionally permissible because they seek to protect
each parent’s right to “inculcate religious beliefs” in their children.46
In some cases, these orders simply permit both parents to celebrate
their respective religious holidays with their children.47 Some courts
use this characterization even when these orders appear to infringe
on one parent’s right to direct religious upbringing. For example, an
order might require one parent to bring his or her children to a religious service or school, during his or her visitation, at the request of
the other parent.48 In other cases, the order might have the practical
effect of precluding one parent from taking his or her children to religious services. If, for example, an order modifies custody so that
one parent has visitation on Sunday mornings and the other parent
wishes to bring his or her children to church at that time, the order
effectively interferes with one parent’s freedom to direct his or her
child’s religious upbringing.49 Courts defend these orders as constituthe family” and refusing to order a Catholic custodial mother to raise her children Jewish, at
the request of the noncustodial father).
45. Courts call these orders “accommodations” as opposed to “restrictions.” See infra note
53. The term “accommodation” exposes the inherent tension between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Simply put, the state is not allowed to interfere with the exercise of religion and at times must make affirmative accommodations for religious practice. On the other hand, those accommodations cannot rise to the
level of a “law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.; Lawrence C.
Marshall, Comment, The Religion Clauses and Compelled Religious Divorces: A Study in
Marital and Constitutional Separations, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1985).
46. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (upholding order requiring the father to present his children at synagogue Sunday school at the request of the
mother during his period of visitation).
47. See Sanborn v. Sanborn, 465 A.2d 888, 894 (N.H. 1983) (vacating portions of divorce
decree relating to visitation in order to permit both parents to celebrate the holidays of their
respective religions with their children).
48. See Johns v. Johns, 918 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding order requiring noncustodial father to bring his children to church services in accordance with the religious training program established by the custodial mother); Grayman v. Hession, 446
N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (ordering Catholic custodial parent to enroll her child
in an after-school Hebrew school program at the request of the noncustodial parent).
49. See, e.g., Rinehimer v. Rinehimer, 485 A.2d 1166, 1168-69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)
(upholding partial custody schedule which effectively prohibited the father from taking his minor sons to church services, thereby precluding him from exposing them to the formal practices
of his religious faith); Burrows v. Brady, 605 A.2d 1312, 1315-16 (R.I. 1992) (holding that cus-
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tionally permissible by explaining that their goal is to support each
parent’s right to direct religious upbringing, not to restrict it.50
Courts do not clearly explain why these orders pose no Constitutional concerns.51 Some courts minimize the intrusion that the order
poses to a parent’s own religious freedom.52 Other courts explain that
the intrusion merely respects that parent’s authority to direct the
children’s religious upbringing.53 Still other courts assert that the order focuses on the children’s welfare and that any incidental infringement on a parent’s religious freedom is constitutionally insignificant.54 In general, courts appear comfortable with such orders
because their express purpose is not to restrict the religious freedom
of either parent. Nonetheless, as a practical matter, some orders do
preclude a parent from involving his or her children in one of the central activities of their religion, such as going to church.

todial mother’s First Amendment rights were not restricted when father was given custody
every Sunday, during the time when she wished to take her children to church, because the order did not restrict the mother from educating her children about her religious beliefs at any
other time).
50. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1157.
51. Some courts do refuse to issue such orders; not because the orders intrude on constitutionally protected areas of religious freedom, but because they are too great an intrusion into
the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent. See Beschle, supra note 27, at 404.
52. See Johns, 918 S.W.2d at 731 (holding that because the noncustodial father was required only to bring his children to services and not to attend them himself, no limitation had
been placed on his freedom of religion); Burrows, 605 A.2d at 1316 ( “[T]he [trial court’s] order
did not infringe upon the mother’s rights to teach her children the formal practices of the Episcopal faith . . . [because it] was more in the nature of an accommodation of each parent’s right
to inculcate religious beliefs in his or her children.”).
53. See Beschle, supra note 27, at 403-04; see also In re Tisckos, 514 N.E.2d 523, 529 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987) (characterizing an order carving out a period during father’s visitation in which
mother has custody and control of children so that they can engage in religious activity as an
“accommodation” to the mother rather than a “restriction” upon the father); Overman v.
Overman, 497 N.E.2d 618, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (finding intrusion “minimal” and stating
that “custodial parent’s right to choose the religious training should be paramount” and requiring that noncustodial parent transport child to weekend religious services in accordance
with custodial parent’s religious training program).
54. See Rinehimer, 485 A.2d at 1169 (noting that custody schedule which effectively prevents father from taking his children to religious services on Sunday mornings was designed
solely in the best interests of the children, not to impinge on his religious freedom).

STRAUBER

984

07/17/98 3:43 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:971

B. Situations in Which Parents Have an Antenuptial Agreement
Regarding Their Child’s Religious Upbringing
Courts are remarkably consistent in their refusal to effectuate
antenuptial religious upbringing agreements.55 In a number of New
York State cases, courts have upheld the validity of religious training
agreements, but only when they are part of a settlement agreement
or incorporated in a divorce decree, not when they are made prior to
marriage.56 The enforceability of antenuptial religious upbringing
agreements becomes an issue at or after divorce, when one parent
asks the court to order the other parent to raise the children in a particular faith, or to refrain from doing so, on the basis of the agreement. The requests are quite broad. They are not limited to specific
religious activities, but often include demands for restrictions on religious “influence” or “indoctrination.”57 Some courts facing such a
request simply ignore the agreement or invalidate it without rigorous
analysis.58 A number of decisions, however, indicate that the courts
55. There are a relatively small number of cases in this area. The discussion focuses on
ten recent cases, from a variety of jurisdictions.
56. See Stevenot v. Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (stating that
“[a]n oral agreement entered into prior to and during the marital relationship is not binding
upon the custodial parent following judicial dissolution of the marriage if its terms have not
been reduced to a writing or included in a stipulation of settlement, divorce judgment, or custody determination”); Mester v. Mester, 296 N.Y.S.2d 193, 198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (same); cf.
Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (noting that courts have
“consistently upheld the validity of agreements as to the religious and moral training of a
child,” especially when confirmed by a judgment of divorce).
57. See, e.g., Weiss v. Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 342, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing
to grant father’s request that mother be restrained from “indoctrinating” children in Christian
faith or enrolling children in any activity “contrary” to Jewish faith); In re Marriage of
Nuechterlein, 587 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (addressing noncustodial father’s request
that court provide for “the continuation of the religious training of the children in the Lutheran
faith,” when parents had agreed to raise their children as Lutherans); Kirchner v. Caughey, 606
A.2d 257, 259 (Md. 1992) (reversing trial court order based on mother’s request that father be
enjoined from “all efforts to indoctrinate the child in the Baptist religion”); Schwarzman v.
Schwarzman, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993, 994 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (ruling against noncustodial father
who sought to enjoin custodial mother from “attempting to change the religion of the infant
issue of the marriage”).
58. See, e.g., Sotnick v. Sotnick, 650 So. 2d 157, 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to
include parties’ marital religious upbringing agreement in divorce judgment, simply stating that
the great weight of legal authority is against these agreements); Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 198
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding that oral premarital agreements are not binding unless their
terms have been reduced to a writing following divorce or have been included in a stipulation
of settlement, divorce judgment or custody determination); MacLagan v. Klein, 473 S.E.2d 778,
781 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the parents had a religious upbringing agreement that
child be raised Jewish without explaining its role in the court’s determination that Jewish father
be responsible for child’s religious training).
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believe that enforcement of such agreements, would be an unconstitutional violation of a parent’s religious freedom.59
If a court refuses to recognize the validity of the agreement, it
will generally resolve the issue in a manner similar to those situations
in which no agreement exists.60 A parent with sole custody has the
authority to direct his or her children’s religious upbringing, regardless of any antenuptial agreement that specifies what the children’s
religious upbringing should be.61 At the same time, the noncustodial
parent also retains the right to expose the children to his or her religion during visitation, despite the existence of an antenuptial
agreement regarding religious upbringing.62 If the parents have joint
legal custody, they are both entitled to direct the children’s religious
upbringing, regardless of an antenuptial agreement determining the
children’s religious upbringing.63 The exercise of this right is limited
only when such exposure to two religions poses a substantial threat of
harm to the children’s welfare.64 Courts generally remain willing to
issue orders characterized as “accommodations” so that both parents

59. See, e.g., Abbo v. Briskin, 660 So. 2d 1157, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining
that the court order restraining mother’s active religious influence over her children would interfere with the mother’s own free exercise of religion); In re Marriage of Bennet, 587 N.E.2d
577, 579 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (engaging in formalistic contract law analysis to determine that
parents did not, in fact, have an enforceable contract to raise their children in the Jewish faith,
but recognizing that if their agreement was enforceable under contract law, it would still raise
constitutional questions); Kirchner, 606 A.2d at 260-62 (mentioning the parents’ oral agreement to raise children in the Catholic faith but reversing, in part, the restriction on father’s religious activities with the children as improper judicial interference with father’s religious practices without discussing potential impact of the agreement); Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d
1228, 1230 n.5 (Mass. 1997) (noting that the majority of courts find “predivorce” agreements
regarding religious upbringing unenforceable on constitutional grounds, without further explanation).
60. See supra Part I.A.
61. See, e.g., Nuechterlein, 587 N.E.2d at 25.
62. See Kirchner, 606 A.2d at 260.
63. See Sotnick, 650 So. 2d at 160.
64. See, e.g., Weiss v. Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 342-44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that without harm to the children, a court cannot restrict either parent’s right to expose his or
her children to religion); Kendall, 687 N.E.2d at 1233 (adhering to substantial harm standard
and noting that application of that requirement protects religious freedom); Schwarzman v.
Schwarzman, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993, 998 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (noting that parental disputes which
do not cause harm to their children are beyond the reach of the law); Zummo v. Zummo, 574
A.2d 1130, 1154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (following the vast majority of courts in requiring a substantial threat of present or future, physical or emotional harm to the children in order to restrict either parent’s right to provide religious exposure and instruction during periods of legal
custody or visitation).
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can indoctrinate their children in the religion they choose, even when
they have agreed otherwise prior to marriage.65
Few cases have provided a detailed rationale for the refusal to
enforce antenuptial religious upbringing agreements, though many
have made vague reference to constitutional considerations.66 In
67
Zummo v. Zummo the court did explain its refusal to enforce such
an agreement. In that case, the appellate court refused to enforce an
antenuptial agreement in which a Roman Catholic father and Jewish
mother agreed that any children they might have would be raised as
Jews.68 The parties agreed, upon divorce, to share legal and physical
custody.69 However, the mother sought and received an order from
the trial court prohibiting the father from taking his children to religious services “contrary to the Jewish faith” during his periods of
custody.70 The appellate court refused to enforce the agreement and
vacated that portion of the order.71 It found such agreements unenforceable for three reasons: 1) they were too vague under standard
contract principles; 2) they threatened to entangle courts in religious
matters; and 3) their enforcement would be contrary to public policy
principles embodied in the Free Exercise Clause: that parents be free
to doubt, question and change their beliefs, and instruct their children in accordance with their beliefs.72 Similarly, in Weiss v. Weiss,73
the court refused the father’s request to prohibit his former wife from
“indoctrinating” their children in the Episcopalian faith during her
custodial time, on the basis of their antenuptial agreement that stated
that their children were to be raised as Jews.74 That court adopted
the Zummo court’s rationale for its refusal to enforce the parents’ an-

65. See, e.g., Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342, 348 (affirming order permitting father to enroll
children in a religious training program regardless of his custody schedule); Zummo, 574 A.2d
at 1158 (ordering Catholic father to present children at Jewish Sunday school, while they are in
his custody as an “accomod[ation]” to Jewish mother’s right to contribute to the children’s religious upbringing).
66. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
67. 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
68. See id. at 1145, 1148.
69. See id. at 1141.
70. Id. at 1142.
71. See id. at 1144.
72. See id.
73. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
74. See id. at 346-47.
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tenuptial agreement pertaining to the children’s religious upbringing.75
II. JUDICIAL RATIONALES FOR REFUSALS TO ENFORCE RELIGIOUS
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS & RESPONSES TO THEM:
CONTRACT PRINCIPLES
Those courts that find antenuptial agreements regarding religious upbringing unenforceable do so based on contract and constitutional principles.76 Courts find these agreements unenforceable under
standard contract principles for two reasons: 1) they are vague and 2)
they seek to bind parties over a long period of time, despite changes
in marital status or religious beliefs.77
A. Judicial Rationales
Under standard contract principles, an agreement is binding and
enforceable only if the parties have agreed to be bound by it and if it
contains sufficiently definite terms.78 An agreement is sufficiently
definite if a court is able to examine the agreement and “fix an exact
meaning upon it.”79 If the terms are indefinite, the court has no objective basis upon which to force the parties to comply with the
agreement, or to impose a suitable penalty should they fail to do so.80
In our hypothetical concerning Paul and Julie, both parties recognize
that they made an agreement. This is true of a majority of custody
75. See id.; see also Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 n.5 (Mass. 1997) (stating
that most courts agree that predivorce religious upbringing agreements are unconstitutional
and therefore unenforceable).
76. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1144-48 (holding that such agreements are not enforceable
because they are too vague to be valid contracts and because they implicate First Amendment
concerns), see also, e.g., Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344-47 (following Zummo court’s arguments
about the vagueness of such agreements and their First Amendment problems).
77. One court found a premarital contract concerning religious upbringing unenforceable
because it lacked the formal element of an offer. See In re Marriage of Bennet, 587 N.E.2d 577,
580 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding, oddly, that respondent might have established the existence of
an agreement, but could not establish an offer, without which there could be no acceptance and
thus no contract).
78. Farnsworth examines contractual indefiniteness in the context of contracts concerning
the purchase and sale of goods. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 3.1, at 160-61 (1990). His discussion is relevant and applicable to the issue here as well, insofar as a court cannot enforce any agreement that fails to express what it was the parties agreed
to.
79. SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 37 (1926) (explaining that an offer
must be capable of creating a definite obligation).
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (1979).
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disputes in which parents have agreed on their children’s religious
upbringing prior to marriage. 81
While parties frequently agree on the existence of an agreement,
they often disagree about its meaning. Antenuptial agreements regarding religious upbringing are almost always vague. Most consist
of a promise, oral or written, to raise children in a particular faith.82
Most courts have found that such a promise, without more, fails to
“provide an adequate basis for objective enforcement.”83 For example, a promise to raise children “Jewish” fails to specify the intensity
and exclusivity of religious indoctrination, to proscribe exposure to
the rituals and practices of other religions, to describe a program of
religious education or to explain which sect of the faith the parties intended to select.84 Thus, when one parent seeks an order restricting
the other parent’s religious activity with the children on the basis of
such an agreement, the court has no objective basis on which to formulate such an order. The agreement gives no indication which activities the order should permit, forbid, or require.85 In most cases,
the court’s only option would be to order the parties to raise the children “Jewish”—an order which would have little or no meaning in
terms of the specific obligations imposed. Without a more specific
agreement that discusses religious education, religious services, or
exposure to other religions, the court has no basis on which to issue a
more specific order to the parties. Even an agreement that a child
shall not attend services contrary to a particular faith is ambiguous.86
First, it does not clarify the meaning of “services.” The term might
be narrowly construed to include only the regular services conducted
by a religious institution or more broadly, to include any activity—
including camps, dances, picnics or youth groups—sponsored by that
81. See, e.g., Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341 (noting that both parents agreed that, prior to
marriage, the mother had converted and signed a religious document promising to rear all children in the Jewish faith); In re Marriage of Neuchterlein, 587 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(noting that mother and father confirmed discussion of the religious upbringing of their children and admitted agreeing that they would raise children as Lutherans); Kirchner v. Caughey,
606 A.2d 257, 260 (Md. 1992) (noting that mother stated that parties had orally agreed to raise
their children Catholic at children’s birth); Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1145 (noting that although
parents agreed prior to marriage to raise their children as Jews, they had different visions of the
exclusivity and intensity of their children’s Jewish education).
82. See cases cited supra note 1.
83. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1144.
84. See id. at 1146.
85. See id.
86. See id. (objecting to trial court’s order that father be prohibited from taking his children to “religious services contrary to the Jewish faith” (internal quotations omitted)).

STRAUBER

1998]

07/17/98 3:43 PM

RELIGIOUS UPBRINGING AGREEMENTS

989

institution. A court could reasonably conclude that it was unable to
issue an order prohibiting a parent from taking his children to
“services,” because the agreement did not indicate, in definite terms,
what was meant by that phrase and because the parties could hold
reasonable and different interpretations of it.
Courts have also found antenuptial religious upbringing agreements unenforceable because they were made prior to the marriage
and “did not contemplate a postdivorce status.”87 In doing so, courts
have assumed that a couple on the verge of marriage is unable to
make an informed decision regarding their potential or likely convictions about religion and childrearing after their marriage has ended.
This argument suggests that because an unexpected circumstance has
arisen, the contract is void upon the occurrence of that circumstance.
In the context of commercial contracts, parties may be excused from
performance when an unexpected contingency arises which makes
their performance commercially impracticable.88 If the event was unexpected and the parties did not allocate the risk of the event in the
contract and the event renders performance so difficult as to be impossible, one party may be excused from performance.89 Similarly, a
court which applies the “changed circumstance” rationale appears to
believe that divorce was entirely unexpected and that once divorce
occurs, it renders performance so difficult (or, more accurately, so
unappealing) to one of the parties that they should be excused from
performance.
Finally, a court might refuse to enforce these agreements because they seek to bind parties with respect to an area of their lives
which they should be free to change. As the Zummo opinion explained:
The First Amendment specifically preserves the essential religious freedom for individuals to grow, to shape, and to amend this
important aspect of their lives, and the lives of their children. Religious freedom was recognized by our founding fathers to be inal-

87. Stevenot v. Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding unenforceable an oral contract made before and reiterated during the marital relationship to raise
children in the Congregational church); see also Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1147 (stating that it would
be difficult for a couple to project themselves into the scenario of a divorce); Schwarzman v.
Schwarzman, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993, 998 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (stating that although mother’s conversion served as evidence of agreement to raise children as Jews, the agreement “was not
projected by the parties to encompass the situation presented by a divorce”).
88. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 9.6, at 543.
89. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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ienable. It remains so today. Thus, while we agree that a parent’s
religious freedom may yield to other compelling interests, we con90
clude that it may not be bargained away.

This argument suggests that enforcement of this contract would be
contrary to public policy. A court will not enforce a contract which,
though facially valid, violates the Constitution.91
B. Responses to Rationales for Nonenforcement Based on Contract
Principles
1. Indefiniteness. The “indefiniteness” that often renders
religious upbringing agreements unenforceable can be eliminated in
most cases by the contracting parties. Many of the agreements which
courts have refused to acknowledge or enforce have been oral
agreements. A couple can begin, as Paul and Julie did, by putting
their agreement in writing. This reduces the possibility that the
couple will dispute the agreement’s existence or its terms. In
addition, putting the terms of their agreement in writing helps the
parties to acknowledge that they are not merely discussing the issue
of their children’s religious upbringing, but are creating an
enforceable agreement.
The written agreement must contain more than a promise to
raise children in a particular faith. The parties should identify, as exhaustively and clearly as possible, all religious institutions, religious
activities, religious services, religious educational institutions, and religious rituals (taking place outside the home) in which they wish
their children to participate. The agreement should include a similar
list of religious practices from which the parties wish their children to
refrain. The agreement should cover only those practices which occur outside the home. Paul and Julie’s agreement includes such an
extensive list.
The agreement should also attempt to eliminate ambiguity in the
terms used to describe the above-mentioned practices. Paul and Julie, for example, have agreed that their children should attend certain
services at a synagogue and should not attend church services. The
phrase “church services,” is subject to a number of interpretations,
which may lead a court to refuse to issue a broad prohibition on
90.
91.

Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1148.
For a response to this argument, see infra Part III.B.
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Paul’s taking his children to such services. But Paul and Julie’s
agreement includes a definition of that term. “Church services” include the regular religious services of any religious institution not affiliated with the Jewish faith. The term does not include weddings,
funerals, and baptisms, or other similar events. Paul and Julie have
also explained that certain church orchestrated gatherings, such as retreats, picnics and afterschool groups are included in their definition
of church services, even when such activities take place outside the
church building.
No contracting couple can entirely eliminate all ambiguity in the
terms of their contract. But Paul and Julie’s hypothetical agreement
demonstrates that it is possible to eliminate much ambiguity in antenuptial religions upbringing agreements. The agreement provides an
objective basis upon which the court could issue an order both requiring or prohibiting each party from bringing their children to the
activities identified.
2. Divorce as a Changed Circumstance. In the commercial
context, a court may excuse nonperformance of a contract if an
92
unexpected development arises. Nonperformance will be excused
only if a contingency has occurred, the risk of the occurrence was not
allocated either by agreement or by custom and finally, occurrence of
the contingency rendered performance impracticable.93 A number of
courts that have addressed the enforceability of antenuptial religious
upbringing agreements have mentioned that the agreement did not
anticipate the possibility of divorce.94 As a result, courts indicate that
divorce is a changed circumstance which renders such an agreement
unenforceable. One court has described divorce as an “unconsidered
possibility.”95
Prospective parents who wish their contract to apply in the event
of a divorce should simply state this intention in their agreement. In
so doing, the parties explicitly acknowledge that their circumstances
may change, and they affirm their commitment to their agreement,
whatever the state of their marriage. Antenuptial contracts which
92. See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 315 (explaining the doctrine of impossibility of performance based on unexpected events).
93. See id.; see also 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 9.6, at 543-58 (explaining the four
elements of impracticability, one of which is that the party seeking to be excused did not
promise to perform, even in the event that performance became impracticable).
94. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
95. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1147.
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specifically provide for property distribution upon divorce are routinely enforced by courts, even if that agreement ceases to appeal to
one of the parties at that time.96 As one court has explained
“everyone knows that circumstances can change . . . so that what initially appeared desirable might prove to be an unfavorable bargain.”97
If the parties agree explicitly that their agreement outlasts divorce,
divorce ought not be viewed as a changed circumstance excusing one
party from performance.
Despite the claim that couples entering into such agreements
“generally will not be able to anticipate the fundamental changes in
circumstances between their prenuptial optimism, their struggles for
accommodation and their ultimate post-divorce disillusionment,”98 a
couple who feels able to do so and wishes to bind themselves to a
particular religious upbringing for their children, despite the possibility of divorce, should be able to do so. The agreement’s very purpose is to protect each party from the risk that either will change
their mind. That risk is even greater upon divorce. If parties wish to
protect themselves against such a circumstance, they should be able
to do so by contract. Paul and Julie have included a phrase in their
agreement, evidencing their contemplation of a possible divorce.
Where the parties have clearly evidenced an intention for the agreement to apply even after a divorce, no court should find the agreement unenforceable for failure to contemplate a post-divorce status.

96. See Laura P. Graham, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Modern
Social Policy: The Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1993) (noting that following the passage of the Married
Women’s Property Acts in many states, state courts routinely upheld provisions within premarital contracts which allocated property upon divorce). Antenuptial agreements must satisfy
local tests of procedural and substantive fairness, however, if they are to be upheld. See Judith
T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements: An Update, 8 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
LAW. 1, 18 (1992).
97. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1990) (refusing to excuse parties from
prenuptial agreement regarding property at divorce and arguing that excuse had been based on
the outdated assumption that women are not knowledgeable enough to understand the nature
of the contracts that they enter).
98. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1147.
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III. JUDICIAL RATIONALES FOR NONENFORCEMENT & RESPONSES:
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
A. Judicial Rationales
Those courts that have discussed the enforceability of antenuptial religious upbringing agreements find that enforcement would
violate the Free Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment.99 For example, enforcement might involve an order
prohibiting a parent from bringing a child to church, or requiring a
parent to raise a child
in the Jewish faith. This would violate the general rule that
“‘constitutionally, American courts are forbidden from interfering
with religious freedoms or . . . preferring one religion over an100
other.’”

The majority of decisions in which courts refuse to enforce antenuptial religious upbringing agreements suggest that enforcement
would be unconstitutional.101 One interpretation of the Zummo
opinion suggests a tri-fold constitutional rubric for analyzing these
agreements:102 first, that enforcement will “entangle” courts in matters of religious doctrine; second, that enforcement will require ongoing observation of and involvement with a family’s religious activities (a type of administrative entanglement); and third, that
enforcement requires interference with each parent’s right to freely
exercise his or her religion and to share that religion with his or her
children.103 The first two concerns fall under the Establishment

99. The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I. This amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). It applies to judicial as well as legislative
action. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); see also Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1144
(explaining that enforcement of antenuptial religious upbringing agreements would be contrary
to the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment).
100. Kirchner v. Caughey, 606 A.2d 257, 262 (Md. 1992) (quoting Munoz v. Munoz, 489
P.2d 1133, 1135 (Wash. 1971)).
101. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
102. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1144.
103. See id.
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Clause of the First Amendment,104 the third under the Free Exercise
Clause.105
1. Doctrinal Entanglement. The Supreme Court has not
addressed the constitutional implications of enforcing an antenuptial
religious upbringing agreement, and there is no controlling federal
authority on that issue. However, the Court’s cases establish that
civil courts cannot resolve questions of religious doctrine as that
would involve courts in religious matters in a manner forbidden by
the Establishment Clause.106 This prohibition arose from an early
case in which a civil court was asked to determine which of two rival
factions of a church espoused the appropriate church teachings, in
order to resolve a property dispute.107 There, the Supreme Court held
that to involve civil courts in core matters of religious belief and
ritual would destroy the autonomy of religious institutions and
thereby subvert fundamental First Amendment values.108
Later cases have recognized that the prohibition against doctrinal entanglement reflects a more fundamental concern about the
government’s appropriate role in religious matters.109 Not only does
the prohibition seek to preserve the autonomy of religious institutions, it recognizes that neither the courts nor the legislative and executive branches can “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism [or] religion.”110 However, courts are not precluded from
resolving a dispute simply because it involves a religious organization. If neutral principles of law apply to the dispute and the court

104. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1226-27 (1988) (discussing
five First Amendment doctrines based on the undesirability of excessive church-state entanglement).
105. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1146.
106. See Marshall, Comment, supra note 45, at 249-53. See generally Michael William Galligan, Note, Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Disputes, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2007 (1983)
(analyzing two approaches to judicial resolution of intrachurch disputes and advocating universal adoption of the rule of neutral principles).
107. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871) (pronouncing an ecclesiastical
judgment final in a property dispute between two Presbyterian factions).
108. See id. at 729; see also Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (holding that civil courts could not resolve a property
dispute which turned on whether a national church’s actions were a substantial departure from
its original tenets of faith and practice).
109. See TRIBE, supra note 104, at 1231.
110. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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need not “rely on religious precepts . . . [or] resolve a religious controversy,” the court may resolve the dispute.111
The nature of a religious upbringing is certainly a question of religious doctrine. As a preliminary question, a court asked to enforce
an agreement must identify which sect of a particular faith the parties
intended to select. If, for example, the parties have made only a
vague promise to raise the children in the Jewish faith, a court will
have no basis on which to determine what that means.112 The Jewish
faith includes a number of sects, among them Orthodox, Conservative and Reform, all of which may differ as to the meaning of the
Jewish faith.113 Even within a particular sect, individuals may differ as
to what activities, rituals or education a particular faith requires. It is
difficult to imagine a court resolving these questions without investigating the requirements, rituals, and beliefs held by different religions or different sects within one religion. Even a more specific
agreement, stating that a child will not attend any religious services
“contrary” to a particular faith would require the court to determine
what a religious service is, and what services are contrary. Again,
such a question requires a court to make judgments about religious
doctrine that the Establishment Clause forbids.114 Thus a court could
refuse to order a parent to comply with a religious upbringing agreement as “the subject matter and the ambiguities of the order make
excessive entanglement in religious matters inevitable if the order is
to be enforced.”115
2. Excessive Administrative Entanglement. Enforcement of
antenuptial agreements regarding religious upbringing also threatens
to involve the court in religious matters, not simply from a doctrinal,
but also from an administrative perspective, in a manner forbidden
by the Establishment Clause. While a number of cases in which
courts decline to enforce religious upbringing agreements refer
111. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (holding that a civil court could resolve a
church property dispute where church documents contained secular language upon which the
court could resolve the dispute, without considering matters of religious doctrine).
112. See Weiss v. Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Sotnick v. Sotnick,
650 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1141, 1144
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
113. See JUDY PETSONK & JIM REMSEN, THE INTERMARRIAGE HANDBOOK 277-86, 334-79
(1988) (discussing the various Jewish sects and their positions on religious education and upbringing).
114. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
115. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1146.
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generally to the Establishment Clause,116 Zummo explicitly relies on
Lemon v. Kurtzman, which established a three-part test for
Establishment Clause claims.117 This three-part inquiry examines
government involvement with religion to determine if it has: 1) a
secular legislative purpose; 2) a principal or primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 3) if it avoids fostering an
excessive government entanglement with religion.118
Lemon invalidated two state statutes providing aid to churchrelated elementary schools based on the third prong of the test.119
The Court held that the “cumulative impact of the entire relationship” arising under the statutes in the relevant state was one of excessive entanglement between government and religion.120 The program
established by the statutes required continuing state oversight of the
religious content of classes taught by a religious organization.121 The
Court deemed that involvement excessive.122 By contrast, in Jimmy
123
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, the Court affirmed
the constitutionality of the application of a sales and use tax to religious materials.124 As that statutory scheme did not implicate state
employees in, or oversight of, appellants’ day to day operations, the
statute in question did not foster an excessive government entangle-

116. See Abbo v. Briskin, 660 So. 2d 1157, 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the
Bill of Rights bars the government from establishing or supporting any particular religion); In
re Marriage of Bennet, 587 N.E.2d 577, 579 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (noting that the trial court had
concluded that enforcement of an antenuptial religious upbringing agreement would violate the
Establishment Clause, but declining to reach that issue after finding that no such agreement
existed); Kirchner v. Caughey, 606 A.2d 257, 261 (Md. 1992) (explaining courts’ reluctance to
interfere with religious faith and training of children as constitutionally forbidden interference
with or preference for religion).
117. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1146 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
118. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. Several years earlier, in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), the Supreme Court had established a two-part
test for Establishment Clause claims several years earlier: 1) whether a statute had the purpose
or 2) primary effect of advancing religion. In Lemon, the Court found that two-part test inadequate and added the third prong, which asks whether a statute fosters an excessive government
entanglement with religion. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The first two prongs of the Lemon
test are not particularly useful in assessing the constitutionality of religious upbringing agreements, as no court has refused to enforce them because they have the purpose or effect of advancing religion.
119. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14.
120. Id. at 614.
121. See id. at 619, 620-21.
122. See id.
123. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
124. See id. at 392.
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ment with religion.125 Zummo also focused on the third prong, and
asked whether the government action involved an “excessive entanglement” with religion, and found that it did.126
The Lemon test has been sharply criticized in recent years.127
The Court has offered other Establishment Clause tests, which have
been termed the “endorsement” test128 or the “coercion” test129 and
sometimes ignored the Lemon test entirely.130 Yet it has never rejected that test in a majority opinion.131 At present, it is not clear
what role the third prong of Lemon plays in Establishment Clause
analysis, as a number of decisions have suggested that the first two
prongs, purpose and effect, are of primary importance.132 In a recent
case, Agostini v. Felton,133 however, the Court noted that it had considered “entanglement” as a factor in its assessment of the constitutionality of a state aid program in which public school teachers enter
parochial school classrooms to teach secular remedial and enrichment classes.134 The Court raised the possibility that pervasive moni125. See id. at 394; cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971) (holding that a single
purpose, one-time construction grant from the government to a college, with no continuing financial relationship or governmental analysis of the institution’s expenditures on secular, as
distinguished from religious, activities did not constitute entanglement in violation of the Establishment Clause).
126. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (citing Lemon, 403
U.S. at 613).
127. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 721 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(advocating the liberation of case law from “the Lemon test’s rigid influence”); Lamb’s Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (noting that “[o]ver the
years . . . no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through [Lemon’s] heart”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Lemon as a “formulaic abstraction . . . which has received
well-earned criticism from many Members of this Court”).
128. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-92 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(explaining the endorsement test, which incorporates the purpose and effect prongs of Lemon).
129. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 599 (holding that a governmental entity may not “persuade or
compel [someone] to participate in a religious exercise”).
130. See id. at 644. The majority in Lee held, without applying Lemon, that a school cannot
conduct religious exercises at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where “young graduates
who object are induced to conform.” Id. at 599.
131. See id. at 603 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that, between 1971 and 1992, the
Court decided 31 Establishment Clause cases and rested its decision in all but one of these on
the basic principles described in Lemon).
132. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 430 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
133. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
134. See id. at 2016 (noting that the Court’s three primary criteria for determining whether
government actions aid religion are whether: 1) the aid results in “governmental indoctrination;” 2) recipients are defined by reference to religion; or 3) the aid creates an excessive entanglement).
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toring of public school teachers, to screen for inculcation of religion
in students, could amount to excessive entanglement but held that no
such monitoring was required in this case.135 Thus the court indicated
that entanglement is still a factor. In any case, the question of excessive government entanglement with religion remains relevant to the
constitutionality of requests that a court prohibit one parent from indoctrinating a child in religion, or restrain one parent from attending
church services with his or her children.136 Such orders may require
an ongoing government supervision of religious activity that could
impermissibly involve the court in religious matters.137
Courts may become entangled in religious matters if, on the basis of an antenuptial religious upbringing agreement, they issue orders restricting one parent’s religious activities with his or her children.
The agreement’s “subject matter . . . make[s] excessive
entanglement in religious matters inevitable if the order is to be enforced.”138 The order, as a form of ongoing governmental supervision
of religious activity, might be considered “excessive entanglement”
with religion and therefore violates the First Amendment. Moreover, as entanglement is a matter of concern to state courts, it must be
addressed in any discussion of the enforceability of religious upbringing agreements.
3. Constitutional Implications of Restricting Free Exercise Rights
in the Context of a Familial Relationship. Family relationships,
including parental rights of custody and control over minor children,
are constitutionally protected from unreasonable state intervention.139
Parents have a constitutionally protected right to control the
education of their children.140 When the familial structure is shattered
by divorce, each parent retains a protected interest in authority over

135. See id. at 2015-16.
136. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
137. See Note, supra note 25, at 1726 n.79 (explaining that judicial enforcement of religious
upbringing agreements threatens to violate the Establishment Clause as “it entangles the court
with religion by requiring it to supervise the child’s religious training continually”). The author
argues against any attempt to control a child’s religious upbringing after a custody order, for
“state intervention and supervision to control religious upbringing violates the independence of
church and state.” Id.
138. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
139. See Mangrum, supra note 24, at 44.
140. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1923).
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his or her children.141 The early cases which established that right did
so on grounds of substantive due process and parental rights, not
religious freedom.142 However, they did involve, in part, the parental
right to control the religious upbringing of children.143
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,144 the Court specifically recognized that
parents have a constitutionally protected right to control the religious
upbringing of their children.145 Yoder established that the Free Exercise clause provides an additional basis for protecting familial autonomy against state intervention, in matters of familial and religious
significance.146 More recently, this right has been described as a
“hybrid,” a free exercise claim that is connected to the rights of parents to direct the education of their children.147 In cases involving
such hybrid rights, the Court has held that the First Amendment bars
application of neutral, generally applicable laws to protected conduct,
in the absence of a compelling state interest.148
141. See Developments in the Law—The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1156, 1328 (1980) [hereinafter The Constitution and the Family].
142. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (noting that the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment include “the right of the individual to . . . marry, establish a home and bring up
children, [and] to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience”). In Pierce, the
Supreme Court held that
the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
protect the upbringing and education of children under their control. . . . The child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.
268 U.S. at 534-35.
143. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 532 (invalidating an Oregon compulsory public school education law, on the basis that the statute unlawfully interfered with parental rights to choose
schools “where the children will receive appropriate mental and religious training”).
144. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
145. See id. at 232.
146. See id.
147. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (discussing the nature of
“hybrid” rights, generally involving a free exercise claim linked to either a communicative or
parental right).
148. See id. at 881 (noting that “the only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as . . . the rights of parents”). Employment
Division v. Smith broke with Supreme Court precedent in rejecting the compelling interest test
as the standard for determining whether government action that substantially burdens religious
practice violates the Free Exercise Clause, even in contexts which do not involve a hybrid right.
Instead, the Court held that a neutral, generally applicable law that incidentally burdens religion, even if that burden is substantial, does not require a compelling government interest, at
least in the criminal context. See id. at 884-87. Congress responded by enacting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, intended to re-establish the compelling interest test for Free Exer-

STRAUBER

1000

07/17/98 3:43 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:971

Specifically, Wisconsin v. Yoder noted that the parental right to
control the religious upbringing of children may be subject to limitation if “it appears that decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of
the child[ren], or have a potential for significant social burdens.”149
Thus the state has a substantial burden to meet in demonstrating an
interest of sufficient magnitude to override parental rights to control
the religious upbringing of children.150 Yoder focused on the rights of
the state as compared to the rights of parents; it did not address the
rights of one parent as compared to the other parent, in directing a
child’s religious education.
One court, refusing to justify restrictions on a parent’s right to
direct his or her children’s religious education has stated that:
each parent must be free to provide religious exposure and instruction, as that parent sees fit, during any and all period of legal custody or visitation without restriction, unless the challenged beliefs or
conduct of the parent are demonstrated to present a substantial
threat of present or future, physical or emotional harm to the
151
child[ren] in absence of the proposed restriction.

If a court seeks to impose a restriction on a parent’s ability to control
his or her child’s religious upbringing, that restriction must be justified by a compelling interest. That “interest” will generally be present only when there is a threat of harm to the children.152 Having
concluded that such a standard must be met, courts have attached little significance to the parents’ decision to curtail their own Free Exercise rights by entering into an agreement to give their children a
particular religious upbringing.153 In Zummo, the court simply concluded that as “[r]eligious freedom was recognized by our founding
cise Claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1994) (“The purposes of this Chapter are—(1) to restore the compelling interest test . . . and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”). The Supreme Court recently found the Act unconstitutional. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1997).
149. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
150. In Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hospital, the Supreme Court affirmed a district
court ruling requiring that children be declared wards of the state for the purpose of obtaining
emergency blood transfusions that the parents would deny based on their religious beliefs. See
390 U.S. 598, 598 (1968), aff’g 278 F. Supp. 488, 503-05 (W.D. Wash. 1967). The district court
found that the children were in mortal danger, see 278 F. Supp. at 503 & n.10, but warned that
not every state intervention to protect the health and welfare of the children would withstand
constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 504.
151. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1154-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
152. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
153. See supra Part I.B.
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fathers to be inalienable, i[t] remains so today. Thus, while we agree
that a parent’s religious freedom may yield to other compelling interests, we conclude that it may not be bargained away.”154
B. Responses
1. Doctrinal Determinations. Vagueness poses a constitutional,
as well as contractual, barrier to judicial enforcement of antenuptial
religious upbringing agreements. Just as the parties can eliminate
indefiniteness by careful drafting, they can also eliminate the
vagueness which would require a court to determine the content of a
religious upbringing in a particular faith.155 If the agreement clearly
identified and defined the rituals, activities and religious services in
which the parties want their children to participate, the court need
not investigate matters of religious doctrine for the purposes of
issuing an order based on that agreement.156 Paul and Julie’s
agreement serves this purpose. It does not require the court to look
beyond the activities identified or to make any determinations
deemed “doctrinal.” A court need not be familiar with a Christian or
Jewish concept of a child’s religious upbringing to order each parent
to bring (and to refrain from bringing) his or her children to the
activities, services, and schools set forth in the agreement.
2. Administrative Entanglement. Judicial enforcement of a
private agreement that sets forth in precise terms the course of
children’s religious upbringing does not impermissibly entangle the
court in religious matters, in violation of the Establishment Clause.
First, the act of contractual interpretation and enforcement does not
present an Establishment Clause problem. The subject matter of the
contract involves religious activities and the contracting parties
constitute a family, which enjoys constitutional protection from state
interference. But a court is not constitutionally prohibited from
resolving this dispute, if it can use neutral principles of contract law
to do so. For example, in the context of intrachurch property
disputes, the Supreme Court has held that when neutral principles of

154. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1148 (emphasis omitted).
155. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties encountered
by courts attempting to interpret and enforce vague agreements).
156. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text (discussing problems that arise when
agreements are not drafted with sufficient specificity).
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law apply to a dispute among members of a church, involving church
property, a court can use those principles to resolve the dispute.157
The affected party in those cases is a constitutionally protected
entity, but a court can apply neutral legal principles to resolve a
dispute within that entity, without violating the Establishment
Clause.158 This is true even though in doing so, the court “will either
support or overturn the [church authority’s] resolution of the
dispute,” and thereby indirectly interfere with that authority.159 A
family which has bound itself by civil contract to a certain course of
action and subsequently disagrees about that course of action should
similarly be able to have their contract enforced, based upon neutral
concepts of civil contract law, even if that contract touches on
religious matters.160 The parties have bound themselves by contract,
that contract imposes rights and obligations; policing adherence to
contractual obligations is a matter that appropriately falls under the
authority of civil courts.161
Enforcement of an order based on the agreement may involve a
court in some oversight of religious matters, which has been deemed
impermissible under the Establishment Clause in certain circumstances.162 Enforcement of a highly specific and detailed contract,
however, reduces the judicial oversight required. A court order restricting a noncustodial parent from “indoctrinating” his or her children in religious matters or one restraining a custodial parent from
“raising” his or her children in a particular faith would require continuous, ongoing inspection of all activities, discussions and interactions between parent and children. This would clearly violate the Es-

157. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603-04 (1979) (explaining that the “neutral-principles”
approach “relies exclusively on objective, well-established [legal] concepts . . . familiar to lawyers and judges” and thus “promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice”).
158. See id. at 604.
159. See id. at 614 (Powell, J., dissenting).
160. See, e.g., Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 137-39, (N.Y. 1983) (enforcing a provision of a Jewish marriage contract or “Ketubah,” whereby husband promised he would appear
before a religious tribunal known as a “Beth Din,” for the purpose of obtaining a religious divorce and characterizing the obligation incurred by the husband as “secular” although the
“Beth Din” is a religious body).
161. Cf. Galligan, supra note 106, at 2026 (noting that whatever problems there may be in
adjudicating intrachurch disputes, there is no justification for immunizing churches from responsibilities that all other associations bear to respect contractual rights of their members).
162. See supra Part III.A.1-2.
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tablishment Clause.163 However, a contract which simply requires the
children to participate in certain religious activities outside the home
and not to participate in others could be enforced with a fairly low
level of supervision. The court would simply order that on certain
days, the children attend religious school or religious activities as the
parents agreed, and not participate in those activities prohibited by
the contract. The level of oversight required to enforce that order is
no greater than that already assumed by courts in a number of custody decisions.
In resolving custody disputes where religion is at issue, courts do
issue and enforce orders that concern religious matters. If, for example, a court orders a Catholic father to bring his children to synagogue, at the request of the Jewish mother during his visitation time,
the court is making an order whose enforcement requires some ongoing judicial supervision of religious matters.164 If a court orders a
custodial Catholic mother to send her children to an afterschool Hebrew school at the request of the Jewish father,165 that too requires
ongoing supervision of religious matters. If a court orders a noncustodial parent who does not practice religion to bring his children to
Sunday school and church services during his hours of visitation at
the custodial parent’s request,166 it involves itself in religious matters.
In all cases, to enforce the order, the court will be required to engage
in ongoing supervision to ensure that a parent fulfills obligations imposed by the court, obligations which are related to religion.
Looking simply at the issue of state involvement with religion,
then, it is no greater when a court orders a parent to deliver his or her
children to church on the basis of a contract than it is when based on
a request of the other parent.167 Nor is the state involvement with re163. See supra notes 116-31 and accompanying text (discussing tests for validity of actions
under the Establishment Clause).
164. See, e.g., Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1157-58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (ordering
noncustodial Catholic father to bring children to synagogue for Sunday school, in accordance
with mother’s program of religious training, during his visitation time).
165. See, e.g., Grayman v. Hession, 446 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
(upholding such an order).
166. See, e.g., Johns v. Johns, 918 S.W.2d 728, 729-31 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding such
an order).
167. Also, it should be noted that in no case is the court expressing a preference for one
religion over another. A court that acts to protect children, to enforce a contract, or to accommodate another parent acts with neutrality toward religious matters. Cf. Beschle, supra note
27, at 421-22 (stating that when the court acts to further the custodial parent’s right to control
the children’s religious education or to prevent confusion in the mind of the children, neither
goal appears invalid under the Lemon purpose and effect analysis).
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ligion any greater when the court orders a parent to refrain from
bringing his or her children to church.168 The ongoing supervision
concern posed by the third prong of the Lemon test does not require
courts to ignore religious upbringing agreements, as courts already
involve themselves in such supervision. Moreover, a highly specific
contract, such as Paul and Julie’s, reduces the oversight required by
the court.
The Zummo opinion indicates that the Establishment Clause requires “benign neutrality” towards both parent’s religious viewpoints.169 A court can maintain its neutrality toward religion while
enforcing a contract that relates to religious matters. As the Supreme
Court has said in the context of civil court adjudication of church
property disputes:
[T]he neutral-principles approach . . . is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious
organization and polity. The method relies exclusively on objective,
well-established concepts of . . . law familiar to lawyers and
judges. . . . Furthermore, the neutral-principles analysis shares the
peculiar genius of private-law systems in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the
170
parties.

Judicial enforcement of a contract seeks simply to determine
what the parties agreed. It does not seek to frustrate either party’s
religious views, even when it touches on religious matters, it simply
requires them to behave in accordance with the contract.171 It does
not involve the court in choosing or favoring one religion over another, as that has already been done by the parties.
3. The Free Exercise Clause. Parents enjoy a constitutionally
protected right to practice any religion they choose and to expose

168. I am not suggesting that the two situations are comparable for the purposes of analysis
under the Free Exercise Clause. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
169. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1157-58 (defending the constitutionality of orders specifically
designed to ensure each parent’s ability to expose his or her children to religious services or
activities).
170. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979).
171. Cf. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. 1983) (finding neutral principles of
contract law applicable to a contract between a husband and wife, with respect to a provision
requiring parties to recognize a religious tribunal to settle their marital disputes and that the
contract dispute could be resolved, and the husband ordered before the tribunal, without involving the court in religion).
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their children to that religion.172 Enforcement of antenuptial religious
upbringing agreements need not interfere with the parent’s right, as
an individual, to practice religion freely. A broad restriction against
indoctrinating or influencing one’s children with respect to religious
matters would interfere with that right. A parent subject to such a
restriction would be unable to speak about religion with the children,
to pray in front of the children, to adorn his or her home with
religious symbols or to engage in an infinite number of activities that
might “influence” the children with respect to religion. At all times
that the parent was in the presence of the children, the parent would
be unable to practice his or her religion.173
An order requiring the children’s attendance at certain religious
activities and prohibiting the children’s attendance at the religious activities of another faith (all of which occur outside the home), however, need not interfere with the parent’s free exercise rights. A
court could issue such an order based on an agreement like Paul and
Julie’s. If Paul was subject to such an order, he would still be free to
discuss religion with his children, to celebrate Christmas and Easter
in his home with them and to pray in their company.
Paul would not, however, be allowed to take his children to
church. While this restriction need not impact his individual right to
practice religion, it does impact his right to contribute to the religious
upbringing of his children. That right, as a general matter, enjoys
constitutional protection, and burdens upon it are subject to a particularly high level of scrutiny.174 However, interference with that
right is constitutionally permissible in this context. First, those cases
which protect a parent’s right to the religious upbringing of their
children arose in the context of a dispute between the state and the
family, not a dispute between a mother and a father.175 Wisconsin’s
compulsory school attendance law, at issue in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
involved “the fundamental interests of parents, as contrasted with
that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their
child.”176 The Court held that such a law could only be justified “if it
172. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Abbo v. Briskin, 660 So. 2d 1157, 1157-60 (holding that the trial court, ordering a Catholic custodial mother to raise her child in the noncustodial parent’s faith and to refrain from actively influencing the child inconsistently with that faith threatened mother’s right
to freely exercise her own religion in her home).
174. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
176. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
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appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of
the children.”177
The principle that a family, or even a divorced parent, has the
right to control the upbringing of children free from state interference does not govern the question present here. As between Paul
and Julie, who has the right to control their children’s religious upbringing?178 How is the court to decide between them? As one commentator has explained, the state ordinarily defers to parental decisions in the area of religious upbringing. However,
[W]hen divorcing parents disagree about their children’s religious
status, these arguments apply equally to both parents’ preferences.
And we have no basis for deciding which parent’s interests to prefer.
The interests are the same interests. The two parents have the same
claim to advance those interests. . . . To put the point crudely, the
179
two rights cancelled each other.

Custody disputes are unique in that judicial involvement is required.180 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the family was freed from the state’s
attempt to direct its children’s education and thus impact the religious training that the parents sought to provide,181 but custody cases
present a different scenario.
Courts faced with a custody dispute must resolve it.182 When that
dispute involves religious issues, any solution the court devises will
interfere with both parents’ right to control their children’s religious
upbringing. The family has that right as an entity, but upon divorce
that entity has split, and, in this case, disagrees on this particular issue. If each parent seeks to raise the children exclusively in one religion, a court inevitably infringes on one, if not both, parent’s right
to direct the children’s religious upbringing. One parent must be

177. Id. at 233-34.
178. That is assuming that neither Paul nor Julie’s religious practices would cause substantial harm and thus require state intervention to protect the children and that neither’s approach
to religion is clearly in the best interests of the children. See id. at 234 (explaining that parental
rights may be limited if parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the children).
179. Schneider, supra note 40, at 885.
180. See Steven M. Zarowny, Note, The Religious Upbringing of Children After Divorce, 56
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 160, 164 (1980) (noting that “child custody contests necessitate state
mediation to determine which parent will be chiefly responsible for raising the child”).
181. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36.
182. See The Constitution and the Family, supra note 141, at 1326 (explaining that in contested custody cases, state intervention in itself does not infringe upon the right of family
autonomy, as the state is “thrust into the role of mediator by necessity”).
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given that right, or each parent may be allowed to direct the children’s religious upbringing during the time he or she spends with
them. Both solutions, even the second, which appears to honor both
parent’s rights, will infringe on the rights of that parent who believes
that to direct a child’s religious upbringing is to raise them exclusively
in one religion. As this is so, the most justifiable infringement is that
which the parties have chosen for themselves, rather than that which
the court imposes upon them. Thus the court should rely on the parties’ own agreement, when they dispute the matter of their children’s
religious upbringing.
Moreover, a number of seemingly neutral judicial solutions to
religious issues in custody disputes in practice restrict one parent’s
ability to expose his or her children to religion. In some cases, the
custody schedule designed by the court, though designed to respect
both parents’ religious beliefs, will entirely preclude one parent from
engaging in certain religious activities with his or her children.183 A
custody determination designed to avoid religious issues entirely may
have the same effect.184 If the parents do not have an agreement, the
Constitution requires the court to leave such restrictions where they
fall.185 To do otherwise would require a court to give preference to a
particular religion or course of religious training. But in those situations, such as Paul and Julie’s, where the parents do have an agreement, the most neutral course for the court is to create a custody and
visitation schedule based on the child’s best interests and then order
both parents to comply with the course of religious upbringing outlined in the agreement that they designed themselves. In that way,
any restrictions imposed by the parties will be self-imposed, rather
than imposed by the court.
If two individuals, such as Paul and Julie, have signed an agreement regarding their children’s religious upbringing, each should be
deemed to have waived his or her right to direct the children’s religious upbringing in a manner not specified in the agreement. A court
183. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Rinehimer v. Rinehimer, 485 A.2d 1166, 1168-69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(stating that court “placed no prohibition upon either parent against taking the children to
services of his or her faith, discussing religious beliefs, or in any other way exposing the boys to
their respective faiths,” but noting that the father was “effectively prevented from taking his
sons to Sunday morning services most of the year”).
185. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 324 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that “in
considering which of two parents shall be awarded custody of their children, the court must
maintain its constitutionally mandated neutrality with respect to the merits of the religious beliefs of the parties”).
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examining an agreement such as Paul and Julie’s should find that
waiver valid, and should enforce the agreement. In situations where
the parties do not have an agreement, a court has no basis to restrict
either party from engaging in religious activities with his or her children, unless those activities pose a risk of substantial harm. But if an
agreement exists, does not pose such a risk, and does not seem adverse to the children’s best interests, a court should enforce it.
The Zummo court wrongly dismissed the possibility that a person’s right to free exercise can be waived.186 Individuals may waive a
number of constitutionally protected rights, among them a criminal
suspect’s right to counsel,187 the right to be present at trial188 and the
privilege against self-incrimination.189 In the context of a “contract
waiver, before . . . any dispute has arisen and whereby a party gives
up in advance his constitutional right” to notice and a hearing prior
to civil judgement, the Supreme Court has held that waiver is valid
when it is “voluntarily, knowing and intelligently made . . . or an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”190
Despite the public policy concerns articulated by the Zummo
opinion with respect to waiver of the right to freely exercise one’s religion, there is substantial support for the theory that private individuals can waive constitutional rights by contract.191 No Supreme
Court case has addressed the precise issue facing Paul and Julie.
However, analogous precedent suggests that when parties make a
186. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (concluding that
religious freedom “may not be bargained away”).
187. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403-06 (1977) (holding that while an accused
may waive his right to have counsel present at an interrogation, there was no “intentional relinquishment” of that right in the present case).
188. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (holding that a defendant can lose his
right to be present at trial, if, after being warned that he will be removed for disorderly and disruptive conduct, he continues to act in such a manner).
189. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (outlining valid waiver of right to
counsel and against self-incrimination).
190. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 184-86 (1971) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (holding that a corporation could validly waive its due process right to notice
and a hearing when a property right is involved, finding such a case to be analogous to waiver
in a criminal context when personal liberty is involved).
191. Courts may apply the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to invalidate those contracts between an individual and the government in which the government offers a benefit to
the individual on the condition that the recipient perform or forgo an activity that the Constitution usually protects from government interference. Even in this area, however, the doctrine is
applied inconsistently. For a general discussion of this doctrine and its application, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415-17 (1989).
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contract which burdens First Amendment rights, a court can enforce
that contract, based on generally applicable rules of contract law, because the parties have imposed the burdens on themselves—that is to
say, they have waived their free speech rights.192 In Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., the Supreme Court found that a newspaper may waive its
First Amendment free press rights, if a reporter agrees to keep confidential the identity of a news source.193 The Court found that enforcement of that agreement did not raise substantial First Amendment issues, despite the fact that the agreement restrained the press
from revealing the news source’s identity.194 The Court found it significant that the restrictions were generated by agreement, as opposed to a state law imposing liability based upon the content of a
publication.195 By concluding that the burdens were self-imposed, and
thereby finding that the First Amendment was not implicated and by
refraining from the balancing of government interests and private
rights usually required to justify infringement upon Constitutional
rights, the Court endorsed the waiver theory.196
As one commentator has noted, the Supreme Court is increasingly unwilling to use the Constitution as a source of public policy to
limit rights acquired by contract.197 As a result, a number of state and
federal courts have “adopted highly flexible views of contractual
waivers of constitutional rights”—including parental rights, First
Amendment rights, Fifth Amendment rights, due process and the
right to jury trial.198 That flexibility should extend to contracts involving rights of free exercise and parental authority.
Paul and Julie’s agreement presents a compelling case for finding
that the parties have validly waived one discrete element of their
right to contribute to their children’s religious upbringing. First, the
right waived is particularly narrow. It does not bar either party from
discussing religion with his or her children or from engaging in relig192. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991); see also Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507, 508 (1980) (per curiam) (upholding the validity of an employment contract in which CIA employee waived his free speech rights insofar as he agreed not to publish
any information related to the agency without prepublication clearance and awarding damages
for contractual violation).
193. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672.
194. See id. at 669-70.
195. See id. at 670-71.
196. See id. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting).
197. See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433,
480 (1993). For an overview of the Court’s approach from this perspective, see id. at 477-80.
198. See id. at 486 (collecting cases).
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ious rituals or activities with his or her children in the home. Nor
does it restrict either person’s right to attend church, or religious activities, if those activities do not involve his or her children. If parties
may freely waive rights involving other liberties protected by the Bill
of Rights,199 a court should not refuse to recognize a waiver of the
right to direct the religious upbringing of one’s children. Second, the
contract provides clear and unambiguous evidence that both parties
knowingly and voluntarily relinquished their constitutional rights.200
CONCLUSION
Antenuptial religious upbringing agreements allow parties, especially those in interfaith marriages, to reduce the risk of conflict regarding their children’s religious upbringing during the marriage. In
crafting such agreements, parties are forced to confront their religious attitudes, as well as their need to share those attitudes with their
children. As the Zummo court recognized, these agreements may
“serve an important and beneficial purpose by promoting careful
consideration of potential difficulties prior to marriage.”201 If the
parents do divorce, an enforceable agreement ensures that their children’s program of religious training will continue as agreed upon.
The agreement does not reduce all risk—for either parent is free,
during or after the marriage, to attempt to influence or indoctrinate
the children in a number of ways, excluding only formal training,
services and activities.202 A couple who chooses to intermarry will be
unable to exclude the possibility that their children will share, to
some extent, in the religious traditions of both parents.203 They are

199. See Marshall, supra note 45, at 233–34 (affirming individual’s ability to waive his free
exercise rights but questioning whether, in the context of a prenuptial agreement, the parties
can be shown to have done so knowingly and voluntarily).
200. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
201. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1147 n.30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
202. This type of influence is not insignificant, and, in extreme circumstances, may even be
damaging to a child. See, e.g., Schwarzman v. Schwarzman, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993, 999 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1976) (observing that “the father utilizes his visitation time to proselytize with the children,
admonishing them that they are Jews, that their mother is doing a sinful thing by taking them to
her Church and that they will suffer the fires of hell if they accede to their mother’s religious
indoctrination”).
203. The court in Zummo noted that:
Couples typically anticipate at the beginning of their relationship that they can overcome all odds in marriage . . . one spouse may fuse into the other’s family by religious conversions, . . . , or by adopting the accoutrements of the other’s culture.

STRAUBER

1998]

07/17/98 3:43 PM

RELIGIOUS UPBRINGING AGREEMENTS

1011

thus forced to internalize some of the risks204 of intermarriage, but
allowed the measure of protection afforded to all individuals and institutions who make contracts to secure and protect their rights.

[However, a] spouse who marries out . . . and raises children without teaching them
his or her native language or cultural traditions may later regret that decision, as the
children grow up with little sense of [his or her suppressed] ethnic identity.
574 A.2d at 1147 n.30 (second alteration in original) (quoting Monica McGoldrick & Nydia
Preto, Ethnic Intermarriage, 23 FAM. PROCESS 347, 347-48, 352, 357 (1984)).
204. Were the religious upbringing agreement unenforceable, each party would be forced
to assume the risk that the other might refuse to abide by agreement. Perhaps then, those who
conditioned their interfaith marriages on religious upbringing agreements would be less likely
to enter into interfaith marriages, and would seek partners with similar religious backgrounds,
which would reduce the risk of marital conflict regarding religious matters. Whether or not this
is a desirable result, it does not justify the denial of the protection of civil courts to those who
rely on these agreements when entering into interfaith marriages.
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APPENDIX
MODEL ANTENUPTUAL AGREEMENT
REGARDING RELIGIOUS UPBRINGING OF CHILDREN
PRODUCED BY THE MARRIAGE
We, _____ and ______ of ______ state, make this agreement in
order to resolve the issue of the religious upbringing of any children
we will have during the course of our marriage. We are advised by
separate counsel, and agree willingly and voluntarily to the provisions
herein, having taken due time to consider their contents. We intend
this contract to apply throughout the course of our marriage, and
were we to divorce, upon divorce.
_____ of [religious faith] and _______ of the Jewish faith, hereby
agree that our children will be raised in the Jewish faith. Our children will be members of ______ Synagogue, which practices Reform
Judaism. We agree that our children, if male will be circumcised at
age [ ], and if female, will be named in a naming ceremony, both to
take place at _____ Synagogue and be conducted by a Rabbi. We
agree that our children will attend secular schools for their general
education, but will attend the religious school at _____ Synagogue,
every Sunday, from age 5 onward. We agree that our children will attend Friday and Saturday night services at _________ Synagogue, and
will attend services on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur from age 1
onward. At age 8, our children will attend the summer camp run by
_______ Synagogue, for the first six weeks of each summer. At age
12, our children will begin preparing to be bar/bat mitzvah at _____
Synagogue.
Our children will not attend the religious services, schools or
camps run by any other religious organization. Our children will participate in religious services of [religious faith of other parent] when
those services are part of a baptism, christening, confirmation, wedding or funeral of a member of the family of _______ of [religious
faith].

